Dialogue and Ecclesial Responsibility

I appreciated Daniel Madigan’s analysis of the difficulties and hopeful prospects of cultural and theological dialogue between Christians and Muslims. Particularly, I found his analysis of the “clash of civilizations” assessment of the relationship between Islam and Christianity to be helpful. It is not the case that recognizing a “clash of civilizations” makes discourse hopeless or unnecessary; rather, it is precisely where the tension between two “civilizations” is most fraught that dialogue and exchange are most important. Furthermore, Madigan’s assessment of the political dimensions of this problem — e.g., the demand for political “reciprocity” with regard to the treatment of religious minorities as a precondition for dialogue — made quite a compelling case that the Church is obligated to engage with other faiths independent of any political demands. Finally, I found Madigan’s perception that dialogue offers an important occasion for an ever clearer (and perhaps, further developed) understanding of distinctive doctrines of Christianity, precisely in encounter with the tools and methods of the religious tradition of Islam.

At the same time, however, I found the Madigan’s inattention to the ecclesial dimension of Christian-Muslim dialogue troubling. Time and again, he takes the opportunity to point out that it is not religions which engage in dialogue, but individuals. At first, this maneuver avoids the facile objection that interreligious dialogue is impossible on account of the theological and practical differences among Muslims. Later, Madigan points several times to the the successes of interreligious dialogue among scholars as examples of the “individual” quality, where real success is possible. Indeed, it does seem that there is more flexibility for dialogue on a personal level, particularly among academics.

However, this maneuver seems to lead to a bifurcation of the individual and collective, such that the ecclesial dimension of interreligious dialogue is largely elided. I find this theological concerning. For one thing, it sees inaccurate to construe dialogue between a Christian and a Muslim as principally an individual phenomenon: in some sense, at least in a theological exchange, both figures seem to represent their respective faith communities (doubly so in the case of an ordained priest as Fr. Madigan). Such a representative status entails a responsibility to one’s faith community and tradition: their beliefs ought to be accurately represented if the exchange is to be between Muslim and Christian, and not merely between two theologians. This, inevitably, has significant consequences for the positions one can take in dialogue, the scope of agreement which is possible, and the goal of that exchange. Can this dynamic of ecclesial representation and responsibility be integrated into Madigan’s vision of Christian-Muslim dialogue? If not, how might it shape or refine our understanding of the goals and concrete practice of interreligious dialogue?